2009/04/21 - Pl. ÚS 42/08: Constitutionality of a Debtor´s Position

21 April 2009

HEADNOTE

The contested

provision, § 394 par. 2, the part of the sentence after the semicolon,

of the Insolvency Act, restricts the implementation of the debtor’s

right to solve his insolvency through debt discharge, although it was

permitted by the previous decision. As a result of a legal fiction that

is applied not only when the debtor does not act, but also by a court’s

substantive judgment, without allowing the debtor to defend against the

ordinary’s court’s decision using regular remedies, his right to a fair

trial is limited, and it is not possible to correct a possible mistake

that may happen in the court’s actions (e.g. a debtor excuses his

absence, but the notice is entered in a different file by mistake,

etc.). Moreover, the fiction of withdrawal of a petition for debt

discharge is not a mere procedural action through which the party

determines the proceeding, but has fundamental substantive law

consequences for the debtor and for creditors (subsequent declaration of

bankruptcy, etc.).



CZECH REPUBLIC

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

JUDGMENT


IN THE NAME OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

 


The

Plenum of the Constitutional Court, consisting of Stanislav Balík,

František Duchoň, Vlasta Formánková, Vojen Güttler, Ivana Janů, Vladimír

Kůrka, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jiří Mucha, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel

Rychetský (judge rapporteur), Miloslav Výborný, Eliška Wagnerová and

Michaela Židlická ruled on a petition from the High Court in Olomouc,

represented by JUDr. Miroslav Jansa, chairman of a panel of the High

Court in Olomouc, seeking the annulment of part of § 394, paragraph 2,

the part of the sentence after the semicolon, and § 93 par. 2 of Act no.

182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency and Methods of Resolving It (the

“Insolvency Act”), with the participation of the Chamber of Deputies and

the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, as follows:
 

I.

Part of § 394, paragraph 2, the part of the sentence after the

semicolon, of Act no. 182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency and Methods of

Resolving It (the “Insolvency Act”), which reads: “appeal against it is

not permitted” is annulled as of the day this judgment is promulgated in

the Collection of Laws.
II. The petition to annul § 93 par. 2 of Act

no. 182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency and Methods of Resolving It (the

“Insolvency Act”) is denied.

 


REASONING
 

I.
Recapitulation of the Petition
 


1.

In a petition submitted under Art. 95 par. 2 of the Constitution of the

Czech Republic (the “Constitution”) and § 64 par. 3 of Act no. 182/1993

Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by later regulations,

the High Court in Olomouc (the “petitioner”) sought a judgment annulling

part of § 394, in paragraph 2, the part of the sentence after the

semicolon, of Act no. 182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency and Methods of

Resolving It (the “Insolvency Act”). The contested provision does not

permit an appeal against a resolution in which the insolvency court

takes cognizance of withdrawal of the debtor’s petition for debt

discharge, and, in the opinion of the High Court in Olomouc, thus

prevents the debtor from seeking protection of his rights before a court

under Art. 36 par. 1 and Art. 38 par. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental

Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). The High Court in Olomouc adds that

a procedural regulation that predetermines the result of an appeal

proceeding on the merits of the matter contravenes the principles of a

law-based state under Art. 1 par. 1 of the Constitution.

2. The

petition indicates that the High Court in Olomouc is conducting

insolvency proceeding opened by petition of the debtor Z. S. The

Regional Court in Ostrava, by resolution of 14 August 2008 ref. no. KSOS

8 INS 3110/2008-A-5, found the debtor insolvent, permitted resolving

the insolvency by debt discharge, and ordered a review hearing for 30

September 2008 at 10:30 a.m., and afterwards called a creditors meeting.

The debtor was duly summoned to the meeting, but did not arrive,

without excusing himself. Therefore, the court of the first instance

decided at that hearing, by resolution of 30 September 2008 ref. no.

KSOS 8 INS 3110/2008-B8, in which, in accordance with § 399 par. 2, the

sentence in fine, after the semicolon, of the Insolvency Act, applied

the statutory fiction of withdrawal of a debtor’s petition to permit

debt discharge, and decided to declare bankruptcy, with the provision

that the bankruptcy would be treated as negligible (§ 314 et seq. of the

Act). On 1 October 2008 the ordinary court received a notification in

which the debtor excused himself from the creditors meeting on the

grounds of illness, and documented the illness with a confirmation of 30

September 2008. The debtor filed a timely appeal against the resolution

of 30 September 2008 ref. no. KSOS 8 INS 3110/2008-B8, in which the

ordinary court took cognizance of the withdrawal of the debtor’s

petition to permit debt discharge, and decided to declare bankruptcy,

with the provision that the bankruptcy would be treated as negligible;

in the appeal, the debtor objected that he did not attend the hearing

due to an urgent decline in health, and documented that fact. In the

appeal proceeding, the High Court in Olomouc seeks annulment of the

contested decision of the court of the first instance.

3. The

High Court in Olomouc also states in its petition that the debtor would

not be in a better position, even it he had excused himself in time and

the court had not found the excuse justified. The fiction of withdrawal

of the petition would then arise not as a consequence of the debtor’s

inactivity, but on the basis of review deliberations by the court of the

first instance, and a debtor has no remedy against such a court

decision, wherein the court evaluates the resulting procedural situation

differently than the debtor, although the consequences for the debtor

are not only procedural, but also substantive law consequences that

affect its existence. The debtor does have a right to file an appeal

against the insolvency court’s decision to resolve the debtor’s

insolvency through bankruptcy; however, as an appeal is not possible

against verdict I., where the court takes cognizance of the withdrawal

of the petition for debt discharge, the court must deny that part of the

debtor’s appeal that is directed against that verdict, without

reviewing the justification of the reasons that prevented the debtor

from attending the creditors meeting. As a result of the denial of the

appeal, verdict I., in which the first-level court took cognizance of

the withdrawal of the petition for debt discharge will remain untouched,

and the appeal court has no alternative but to confirm the first-level

court’s decision in verdict II., to resolve the debtor’s insolvency

through bankruptcy, because the first-level court’s decision is fully in

accordance with § 396 par. 1 of the Insolvency Act. Thus, procedural

regulations remove the debtor’s right to resolve his insolvency through

debt discharge, which was permitted by the previous court decision.

Thus, the result of the appeal proceeding is predetermined by the

relationship between § 394 par. 2, § 396 par. 1 and § 399 par. 2 of the

Insolvency Act so that the declaration of bankruptcy of the debtor must

be affirmed. The appeal proceeding thus becomes an empty, formal ritual.

4.

In discussing the appeal, the High Court in Olomouc concluded that the

part of § 394 par. 2 of the Insolvency Act that does not permit an

appeal against a resolution in which the insolvency court takes

cognizance of withdrawal of the debtor’s petition for debt discharge is

inconsistent with the abovementioned provisions of the Charter, and

therefore it submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court seeking

its annulment. The contested provision prevents a debtor from seeking

protection of his rights before a court in terms of Art. 36 par. 1 and

Art. 38 par. 2 of the Charter, a procedural regulation that

predetermines the result of an appeal proceeding on the merits of the

matter contravenes the principles of a law-based state under Art. 1 par.

1 of the Constitution. The unconstitutional consequences of this

regulation of the right to an appeal can be avoided only by annulling §

394 par. 2, the part of the sentence after the semicolon, of the

Insolvency Act, because, under Art. 95 par. 1 of the Constitution, an

appeals court is bound by the clear wording of a statutory norm when

this wording does not give the appeals court any possibility for a

constitutional interpretation. The right to contest a decision by a

first-level court is a procedural right, which is given or ruled out by

procedural regulations, but the insolvency court’s decision, in which it

took cognizance of withdrawal of the debtor’s petition for debt

discharge, under § 394 par. 2 of the Insolvency Act, cannot be

considered a mere decision on conducting a proceeding, by which a court

would not be bound. Above all, it expresses consequences arising from §

399 par. 2 of the Insolvency Act and declares a legal fiction arising

either from the debtor’s inactivity, or even from the court’s

substantive deliberations. The entire statutory construction then

connects to this insolvency court decision another irrevocable decision

in the matter itself, which has substantive law consequences for the

debtor and for creditors, and for the debtor these are consequences of

existential importance.

5. In the second part of the petition

submitted under Art. 95 par. 2 of the Constitution a § 64 par. 3 of the

Act on the Constitutional Court, the High Court in Olomouc seeks a

judgment annulling § 93 par. 2 of Act no. 182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency

and Methods of Resolving It (the Insolvency Act). The contested

provision requires the appeals court to rule on an appeal against the

method of resolving insolvency no later than two months after it is

presented by the first-level court. In view of the submission of the

present petition to the Constitutional Court, this deadline cannot be

met. The appeals court is aware that this is a procedural deadline and

protection of the constitutional order takes precedence over observing

this deadline; however, the High Court in Olomouc believes that simple

law should not create formal obstacles by setting procedural deadlines

which, if observed, would hinder protection of the constitutional order,

and therefore it proposes that the Constitutional Court also annul § 93

par. 2 of the Insolvency Act, because annulling it will not affect the

speed of the appeal proceeding in an insolvency proceeding, because that

is secured by § 92 of the Insolvency Act, which would remain untouched.



6. The petitioner also proposes, in view of the arguments

presented under point 5, and in view of the fact that is interrupting

insolvency proceedings is not possible under § 84 par. 1 of the

Insolvency Act, and also in view of the fact that, regardless of the

debtor’s appeal, consequences of the declaration of bankruptcy have

already taken place by virtue of publication of the decision to declare

bankruptcy in the insolvency register, that the Constitutional Court

treat the petition as urgent under § 39 of the Act on the Constitutional

Court.
 


II.
Conduct of the Proceeding and Recapitulation of the Responses of the Parties to the Proceeding
 

7.

In response from the Constitutional Court’s request, under § 69 of the

Act on the Constitutional Court the Chamber of Deputies of the

Parliament of the Czech Republic submitted a response through its

chairman, Ing. Miloslav Vlček. The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech

Republic did likewise, through its chairman, MUDr. Přemysl Sobotka.

8. In its response, the Chamber of Deputies summarizes the process of adopting the contested provisions.

9.

The Senate primarily addresses the process of adopting the contested

provisions. It then states that there was no discussion of the contested

provisions. There was debate about the institution of debt discharge

only relating to the possibility of debt discharge of a legal entity

that is not an entrepreneur. Thus, there were no statements made in the

upper house of Parliament that could either support or refute the

petitioner’s claim that § 394 par. 2, the part of the sentence after the

semicolon, and § 93 par. 2 of the Insolvency Act are unconstitutional.

10.

The parties to the proceeding stated expressly – or by implication, by

the deadline – consent to waive a hearing, and the Constitutional Court

did not hold a hearing because it could not be expected to clarify the

matter further.
 


III.
Text of the Contested Legal Provision
 

11. The contested provision of the Insolvency Act reads:
§ 394
 […]
(2)

The insolvency court shall take cognizance of withdrawal of a petition

to permit debt discharge in a decision that is delivered to the person

who filed the petition, the debtor, the insolvency administrator and the

creditors committee; an appeal against the decision is not permitted.
[…]

§ 93
[…]
(2)

The insolvency court shall review and rule on an appeal against a

decision under paragraph 1 no later than 2 months after the appeal is

presented to it by the court of the first instance; this does not affect

§ 92.
 


IV.
Petitioner’s Active Standing
 

12.

The petitioner derives its active standing to submit the present

petition from Art. 95 par. 2 of the Constitution. If, under that

provision, a court concludes that a statute that is to be used in

resolving a matter is inconsistent with the constitutional order, it

shall submit the matter to the Constitutional Court. The court’s right

is made specific in § 64 par. 3 of the Act on the Constitutional Court

as the right to submit a petition to annul a statute or individual

provisions thereof. That means that the active standing of a court to

submit a petition to annul a statute or individual provisions of a

statue is derived from the subject matter of the dispute and its legal

classification. In other words, a court can submit a petition to annul

only a statute, or individual provisions of a statute, that are to be

applied in resolving a dispute that is being heard before an ordinary

court. The deliberation about applying it (them) must be supported with

reasons, must be derived from meeting the conditions of the proceeding,

including the active standing of the parties, and in the case of a

substantive law regulation, must be derived from an unambiguous

determination that the regulation is to be applied [see judgment file

no. Pl. ÚS 50/05 of 16 October 2007 (2/2008 Coll.), point 11].

13.

The foregoing indicates that the contested provision is decisive for

the success of one of the parties in the proceeding before the

petitioner. Thus, the petitioner meets the conditions for active

standing to submit the present petition to the Constitutional Court as

defined in the previous point.
 


V.
 

Constitutional Conformity of the Legislative Process
14.

Under § 68 par. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the

Constitutional Court, in addition to reviewing the contested statute for

consistency with constitutional acts, is to determine whether it was

adopted and issued within the bounds of constitutionally provided

competence and in a constitutionally prescribed manner.

15.

Because the petitioner did not raise the objection of a flaw in the

legislative process, or that the legislature exceeded its

constitutionally provided competence, in view of the principles of

procedural economy it is not necessary to review this question in more

detail, and it will suffice, in addition to considering the responses

submitted by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (see above, points 8

and 9 of this judgment), to formally verify the conduct of the

legislative process from publicly available information at

www.psp.cz.

16. The Constitutional Court determined that

the draft act later promulgated as no. 182/2006 Coll. (Chamber of

Deputies publication 1120/2 from 2002-2006, its 4th term of office), was

processed by the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament as publication

1120 in the first reading on 26 October 2005, and assigned for review to

the Constitutional Law Committee, which discussed it at a meeting on 1

December 2005, and on 20 January 2006 recommended that it be approved,

as amended by a comprehensive amending proposal contained in the

committee’s resolution no. 235 (publication 1120/1). This comprehensive

amending proposal also revised the contested provision of § 394 par. 2.

The bill went through a second reading on 27 January 2006, and amending

proposals made in the second reading were processed as publication

1120/2. The draft act was approved by the necessary majority of deputies

present in the third reading on 8 February 2006, as amended by

comprehensive amending proposals. The bill was presented to the Senate

on 28 February 2006, and the Senate Organization Committee assigned it

for review, as publication no. 288 (5th term of office) to the

Constitutional Law Committee. The committee reviewed the bill on 15

March 2006 and adopted resolution no. 93 (Senate publication no. 228/1),

in which it recommended that the Senate approve the bill in the version

presented by the Chamber of Deputies. The Plenum of the Senate

discussed the bill at its 10th session on 30 March 2006, and it was

approved, in the version presented by the Chamber of Deputies, in vote

no. 199 on bill resolution no. 416. Out of 54 senators present, 49 voted

in favor, 5 senators abstained, and none voted against. The act was

delivered to the President for signature on 7 April 2006, and he signed

it on 14 April 2006. The approved act was delivered to the Prime

Minister for signature on 27 April 2006 and was promulgated in the

Collection of Laws on 9 May 2006, in part 62 as number 182/2006 Coll.

17.

The Constitutional Court states that Act no. 182/2006 Coll. was adopted

and issued within the bounds of constitutionally provided competence

and in a constitutionally prescribed manner, or that in this proceeding

it found nothing to support a contrary conclusion.
 


VI.
The Constitutional Court’s Review
 

18.

The Constitutional Court first considered whether § 394 par. 2, the

part of the sentence after the semicolon, of the Insolvency Act was

consistent with Art. 36 par. 1 of the Charter, under which everyone may

assert, through the legally prescribed procedure, his rights before an

independent and impartial court or, in specified cases, before another

body, and Art. 38 par. 2 of the Charter, under which everyone has the

right to have his case considered in public, without unnecessary delay,

and in her presence, as well as to express her views on all of the

admitted evidence. The public may be excluded only in cases specified by

law.

19. In its previous case law the Constitutional Court

clearly stated that if, under Art. 36 par. 1 of the Charter everyone has

the right to assert his rights before a court or another body, and the

conditions for exercising that right are provided by a statute, then

that statute, issued on the basis of constitutional authorization, may

not completely negate everyone’s right to seek protection of his rights

before a court or another body in one or another situation, and thereby

also deny a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, even if only

in certain cases. Art. 36 par. 1 of the Charter constitutionally

guarantees everyone the right to seek protection of his rights before a

court or another body in all situations where the rights have been

violated (there is no constitutional restriction here). In other words,

no person can be completely excluded by law from the opportunity to seek

protection of his right, even if only in a particular case, because his

right under Art. 36 par. 1 of the Charter would be annulled. A contrary

interpretation would also mean that the establishment of everyone’s

right to turn to judicial and other bodies for protection of his rights

as enshrined by the constitutional framers – endowed with the highest

legal force – would basically lose its meaning, because it could be

annulled for one or another situation only by the will of the

legislature. [judgment file no. Pl. ÚS 12/07 of 20 May 2008, judgment

file no. Pl. ÚS 72/06 of 29 January 2008 (291/2008 Coll.), both

available at nalus.usoud.cz].

20. The civil process rests

on two fundamental principles – the dispositive principle and the

procedural principle. The close connection between substantive private

law and public civil procedural law is best expressed through the

dispositive principle. The meaning and purpose of civil procedure law is

to protect subjective private rights, i.e. public civil procedure law

serves the private substantive law, and if it does not fulfill its role,

it loses its purpose. The functional ties between private substantive

law, which is based on the autonomy of will of the parties to private

law relationships, and public civil procedure law are reflected in the

area of procedural law, primarily through the dispositive principle,

which governs civil trials. The dispositive principle is a specific

projection of the private law autonomy of will into the field of civil

trials. It is up to the parties to determine both the proceeding and the

subject matter of the proceeding, freely, in accordance with the

dispositive principle. Procedural rights, which are derived from the

dispositive principle, are reserved exclusively for those who have these

rights through dispositive procedural actions; the nature of these

dispositive procedural actions indicates that they may not be part of a

legal fiction, i.e. it cannot be deemed that someone withdrew a petition

even though he did not do so. The legal construct of the fiction of

withdrawal of a petition for debt discharge is inconsistent with the

nature of a civil trial, which is true not only for an adversarial

trial, but for any kind of civil judicial proceedings, i.e. including

insolvency proceedings. A dispositive legal action may not be part of a

legal fiction without violating the dispositive principle, on which the

civil proceeding is built, and, ultimately, also violating the principle

of autonomy of will. As the Constitutional Court stated, e.g. in

judgment file no. I. ÚS 167/04, “the autonomy of the will and individual

liberty of action guaranteed on the constitutional level by Art. 2 par.

3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms. Art. 2 par. 3

of the Charter must be understood in a double sense. In its first

dimension it represents a structural principle, according to which state

authority may be asserted in relation to the individual and his

autonomous sphere (including autonomous manifestations of the will)

solely in cases where an individual’s conduct violates an explicitly

formulated prohibition laid down in law. However, such prohibition must,

in addition, reflect solely the requirements consisting in preventing

the individual in encroaching upon the rights of others and in the

attainment of the public good, provided that such restriction upon the

individual liberty of action is legitimate and proportional. Such

principle must, then, be conceived of as an essential attribute of every

democratic law-based state (Art. 1 par. 1 or the Constitution of the

Czech Republic). Art. 2 par. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic

has a like content. In its second dimension, Art. 2 par. 3 of the

Charter operates as an individual right to the respect by state

authorities of the autonomous manifestation of one’s personhood

(including manifestations of the will), which are reflected in a

person’s specific conduct, to the extent that such conduct is not

expressly prohibited by law. In its second dimension, in which it

operates as an individual fundamental right, Art. 2 par. 3 must be

applied immediately and directly. In this dimension it does not merely

radiate through ordinary law, rather it is an individual right which

operates directly in relation to state authority. Thus, when state

bodies apply ordinary law, they are also obliged to interpret the norms

of that law, in which Art. 2 par. 3 of the Charter and Art. 2 par. 4 of

the Constitution of the Czech Republic are reflected as objective

constitutional principles, in such a manner that they do not encroach

upon the right of the individual to the autonomy of his will, which is

guaranteed by the second dimension of Art. 2 par. 3. The obligation to

respect the autonomy of the will applies not only to the bodies that

interpret and apply the law, but undoubtedly also to the legislature.

Therefore, on the one hand the effort to speed up proceedings is

desirable, but on the other hand it may take such a form that, by

simulating a party’s procedural action, it actually removes his

opportunity to act freely. That is why, for example, in all developed

legal systems the institutions of presumptions are used exclusively in

determining the facts, i.e. in clarifying and determining the decisive

factual circumstances. Institutions for speeding up the process (e.g. a

default judgment or preclusive deadlines ) are used only in an area

where the procedural principle applies, and it is not possible to use

these means to determine a proceeding or the subject matter of a

proceeding in the interests of speeding up the proceeding. The function

of a legal fiction is not to make probable certain decisive facts; even

less so may a legal fiction apply to the fundamental right of a party to

a proceeding to determine a proceeding and the subject matter of a

proceeding (cf. Macur, J. Rozsudek na základě fikce uznání nároku podle

ustanovení § 114b o. s. ř. [A Decision on the Basis of the Fiction of

Recognizing a Claim under § 114b of the Civil Procedure Code] Bulletin

Advokacie [Bulletin of Advocacy], no. 2/2002, pp. 28-36).

21. The

contested provision, § 394 par. 2, the part of the sentence after the

semicolon, of the Insolvency Act, restricts the implementation of the

debtor’s right to solve his insolvency through debt discharge, although

it was permitted by the previous decision. As a result of a legal

fiction that is applied not only when the debtor does not act, but also

by a court’s substantive judgment, without allowing the debtor to defend

against the ordinary’s court’s decision using regular remedies, his

right to a fair trial is limited, and it is not possible to correct a

possible mistake that may happen in the court’s actions (e.g. a debtor

excuses his absence, but the notice is entered in a different file by

mistake, etc.). Moreover, the fiction of withdrawal of a petition for

debt discharge is not a mere procedural action through which the party

determines the proceeding, but has fundamental substantive law

consequences for the debtor and for creditors (subsequent declaration of

bankruptcy, etc.).

22. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the

Constitutional Court concluded, that the contested provision § 394, in

paragraph 2, the part of the sentence after the semicolon, of Act no.

182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency and Methods of Resolving It (the

Insolvency Act) is inconsistent with Art. 36 par. 1 and Art. 38 par. 2

of the Charter, and therefore it annulled that provision as of the day

this judgment is promulgated in the Collection of Laws. The

Constitutional Court states that the fundamental reason why the annulled

provision is unconstitutional is its connection in application to the

obviously unconstitutional part of § 399 par. 2, the sentence after the

semicolon, which reads: “if he does not appear without excusing himself,

or if the insolvency court does not find his reason justified, he is

deemed to have withdrawn the petition for debt discharge.” However, the

High Court in Olomouc did not directly apply this provision,

establishing the legal fiction of withdrawal of a petition for debt

discharge in its decision making (proceeding on an appeal), and

therefore it did not have active standing to submit a petition to annul

it. Such a petition was undoubtedly available to the Regional Court in

Ostrava, as the court of the first instance, but that court did not use

it. Thus, it is outside the scope of review before the Constitutional

Court, which is bound by the petition from the High Court in Olomouc.

23.

The Constitutional Court also considered whether § 93 par. 2 of Act no.

182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency and Methods of Resolving It (the

Insolvency Act) is consistent with Art. 36 par. 1 of the Charter, under

which everyone may assert, through the legally prescribed procedure, his

rights before an independent and impartial court or, in specified

cases, before another body.

24. The contested provision sets a

procedural deadlineof two months by which the appeals court is to rule

on the appeal. If this were a preclusive deadline, i.e. if the right

expired, or if other fundamental legal consequences were tied to the

expiration of the deadline (e.g. a legal fiction or presumption) that

deadline would have to be considered unconstitutional, i.e. inconsistent

with the principle of a fair trial. On the other hand, it must be

emphasized that introducing procedural deadlines for court decisions may

not be to the detriment of truthful determination of facts that lie at

the foundations of substantive law relationships and subjective rights.

The statutory deadline in § 93 par. 2 of the Insolvency Act applies to a

decision on an appeal against an order by a preliminary injunction,

against a decision on insolvency and against a decision on the method

for resolving insolvency, i.e. it is an initial solution of the debtor’s

situation, when it is essential to limit any delays, and since it is a

procedural deadline, its definition is not inconsistent with the right

to a fair trial.

25. For the foregoing reasons, the

Constitutional Court concluded that the contested provision § 93 par. 2

of Act no. 182/2006 Coll., on Insolvency and Methods of Resolving It

(the Insolvency Act) is not inconsistent with Art. 36 par. 1, and

therefore it denied the petition to annul it.

26. The

Constitutional Court granted the proposal of the High Court in Olomouc

and treated the petition as urgent under § 39 of the Act on the

Constitutional Court.

Instruction: Decisions of the Constitutional Court cannot be appealed.