Pl. ÚS 27/23
The District Court in Vyškov sought to annul the second sentence of Section 2958 of the Civil Code, which states: “In the case of bodily harm, the tortfeasor shall compensate the victim for such harm in money, fully compensating for the pain and other non-pecuniary harm suffered; if the bodily harm resulted in an impediment to a better future for the victim, the tortfeasor shall also compensate him for the deteriorated social position. Where the amount of compensation cannot be determined in this manner, it is determined according to the principles of decency.” This request was made in relation to an application demanding a payment of CZK 117,344 as compensation for bodily harm. The petitioner argued that in this case, the second sentence of Section 2958 of the Civil Code, which he believes to be in conflict with the constitutional order, must be applied.
The petitioner perceived the contested provision’s conflict with the constitutional order on two fronts. Directly regarding the second sentence of Section 2958 of the Civil Code, he noted that the provision’s unpredictable applicability rendered it contrary to the principles of legal predictability, certainty, and judicial decision-making predictability, thus conflicting with the principles of the rule of law. The methodology for compensating bodily harm, in his view, was not adopted through a transparent procedural process. The petitioner also suggested that the legislator was aware that courts would be unable to make compensation decisions without implementing regulations or other foundational materials that would allow for a predictable quantification of other than proprietary harm. The deliberate creation of this vacuum, he argued, was intended to enable a group of “interested parties” to develop a methodology to centre the application of Section 2958 of the Civil Code. However, this methodology is a commercial product created without authorisation or public oversight, circumventing the legislative process. Its obligatory nature stems from the hierarchical organisation of the system of general courts.
The Plenum of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Kateřina Ronovská) dismissed the motion.
The Constitutional Court found no evidence that the contested second sentence of Section 2958 of the Civil Code conflicted with the constitutional order, particularly concerning the principles of legal predictability and certainty. The provision’s vagueness may only constitute a conflict with the rule of law principles (notably legal certainty and predictability) when it cannot be interpreted using standard interpretive methods and procedures.
The principles of decency are a fundamental requirement for any assessment of bodily harm compensation and form an integral part of Section 2958 of the Civil Code. It is a broadly defined and conceptually extensive (vague) legal term, aimed at providing courts the latitude to consider cases fairly and sensibly within their individual contexts, holding them accountable.
In essence, when a court is tasked with determining the amount of injury compensation, it is within its discretion to decide how the compensation should be calculated to align with decency principles while fully respecting the requirement for complete damage reparation. It must always take into account the specifics of each case to ensure a reasonable and fair judgement.
As previously mentioned in judgment file No I. ÚS 1010/22, the Constitutional Court reiterated that general courts must consider the methodology’s non-binding nature and its content limitations when using it as an interpretive tool. It is apparent, then, that the resolution to the challenges faced in applying Section 2958 of the Civil Code does not lie in its annulment by the Constitutional Court (as the petitioner sought). Instead, the solution lies in the courts’ appropriate, thorough, and constitutionally consistent interpretation and application of this provision. The Constitutional Court also highlighted that foreign legal systems establish general rules for determining bodily harm compensation, which are often more succinct than the Czech solution. Reference can be made, for example, to Section 1325 of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) or Section 253(2) of the German Civil Code (BGB).
The creation of a non-binding methodology was driven by the aim to enhance legal certainty and the predictability of the law in the period leading up to and following the enactment of the Civil Code and other related legal regulations, which came into effect in 2014. This was in line with the assumption mentioned in the explanatory report to the Civil Code, that judicial practice would develop its own compensation principles. Thus, the methodology should be seen not as a covertly binding regulatory measure but rather as a supportive basis, a “springboard” for courts to determine the extent of compensation for other than proprietary harm, for suffered pain and social integration difficulties.
Therefore, it is not a “covert” binding legal regulation, and courts are not and cannot be obliged to apply it “by default”. They must ensure the predictability of their own decisions regarding compensation for bodily harm, always in line with the principle of full reparation of damage and the principles of decency. Currently, the practical significance of the methodology has partially diminished as, over more than a decade of application, it has been integrated into the decision-making practices of both the Supreme Court and lower courts, thereby refining its criteria. The Constitutional Court, moreover, is not tasked with addressing the practical difficulties that arise in the use of this interpretative aid, which was adopted by legal practice for interpreting the provision contested by the petitioner.