I. ÚS 1858/23
The child’s parents (the mother and her husband) met abroad and have been living together as a married couple since 2017. In the autumn of 2020, the mother (an intervener) gave birth to a son (a minor complainant), her middle child. The mother’s husband (an intervener) is registered as the child’s father. The parents have two other children together, and the family resides together in the Czech Republic. The mother previously worked abroad, where she met the complainant. They were partners at the turn of 2016 and 2017. After their breakup, they occasionally communicated and even met later on.
The complainant approached the courts claiming that in spring 2020, the mother announced her pregnancy, suggesting he was likely the father, that she would be getting a divorce, and that the child would be put up for adoption. The complainant believes he is the biological father. He wants the courts to determine the existence of a biological relationship between him and the child through a DNA test and to establish their contact for one week every quarter of a year. The complainant stated that his goal is not to disrupt the family. He does not plan to reveal to the child that he is his biological father. He fully respects the mother’s husband acting as the father and merely wants the opportunity to regularly meet with his biological offspring and contribute financially to his upbringing. The complainant lives abroad, has never visited the mother in the Czech Republic, and has never seen the child.
The Municipal Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that for the minor, who lives in a harmonious family environment with his parents and siblings and has never met the complainant nor formed any relationship with him, questioning the paternity of the mother's husband is against the child's best interest. Hence, the court decided against ordering a DNA test. This decision was upheld by the Regional Court as substantively correct, leading the complainant to appeal to the Constitutional Court.
The First Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Jaromír Jirsa) dismissed the constitutional complaint.
Although the Constitutional Court recognised that forgoing the DNA test to determine biological paternity and possibly regulate contact infringed upon the private life rights of both the purported biological father and the three-year-old child, the judiciary’s actions were grounded in a constitutionally compliant interpretation of Sections 771 and 927 of the Civil Code. This interpretation allows for the pursuit of various legitimate aims and the balancing of the opposing interests of those involved. The intervention was deemed proportionate since it currently does not serve the best interest of the three-year-old child—who enjoys a stable family life with his mother, legal father, and siblings—for the courts to ascertain through a DNA test whether he is the biological son of another man and to potentially modify their interactions accordingly.
Conducting the DNA test now could risk destabilising the boy’s secure family setting. It is apparent that the mother and her husband have united in the present circumstance and opted to remain in ambiguity regarding the biological paternity. The husband has wholeheartedly embraced the paternal role, treating the three-year-old no differently from his other children. Refusing the DNA test motion allows the family time to reflect and plan their future actions thoughtfully.
Conversely, immediate DNA testing with a positive outcome could subject the family to a scenario where the mother and her husband would face significant pressure from the “introduction” of the alleged biological father into their child’s life, necessitating adjustments. The Constitutional Court underscored the indelible risk that a stable and functional family backdrop could be irreversibly disturbed, detrimentally affecting the child above all. The Court also took into account that the three-year-old boy has two other young siblings, whose relationships might also be impacted by such judicial intervention.
According to the Constitutional Court, a stable and robust family environment is crucial for the fundamental development of the three-year-old child, and the risk of disruption due to DNA testing simply does not match the potential benefits of “newly discovered” biological paternity. The alleged biological father lives overseas and wishes to meet with the now three-year-old child for one week every quarter, without any declared intention during the proceedings to relocate to the Czech Republic to be with the child. Even if an actual relationship between the complainant and the child were established without significant barriers, the creation of a new, intermittently disrupted “week-long” relationship in the child’s early years is not deemed so vital to his development by the Constitutional Court that it outweighs the risk of disbanding a functioning family.
Explaining such complex family situation to a three-year-old child is virtually impossible, necessitating a degree of fiction to persist in the years following the determination of biological paternity. Thus, “uncovering the truth about one’s origins” is, in relation to the three-year-old, more of an abstract concept that does not necessarily align with his current best interest but rather seems to cater more to the best interest of the alleged biological father, who must live with uncertainty. While the Constitutional Court does not trivialise the infringement on the purported biological father’s right to private life, it considers the intervention justified, particularly in light of the child’s interest in growing up peacefully with those who have provided him with full care since birth.
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the current ruling is not irreversible. The courts evaluated the child’s best interest at the time he was three years old. The case may be reassessed in light of changes within the family dynamics. The Constitutional Court also appealed to the adult participants to seek an out-of-court resolution.