II. ÚS 2065/23

The complainant, who had been convicted of fraudulent criminal activity, was released on parole. In doing so, the court decided on a probationary period of five years and ordered her to compensate, to the best of her ability, the damage caused by her criminal activity. After the expiry of the probationary period, the District Court for Prague 6 decided that the complainant would serve the remainder of her sentence of imprisonment. The court asked the victims in writing whether the complainant had compensated them for the damage caused. Those who contacted the court stated that they were not aware of such compensation or that the complainant had not compensated them. Therefore, the court concluded that the complainant had not properly fulfilled the only obligation imposed on her for the conditional release. The complainant filed a complaint against the District Court’s order, which was dismissed by the Municipal Court in Prague.

In her constitutional complaint, the complainant argued that the courts failed to examine how she paid for the damage caused by the criminal activity. Immediately after her release, she found a job and lived an orderly life the whole time. She stopped working only recently because of her poor health. Deductions were made from her wages to satisfy the execution, which the complainant believed was to pay for the damage caused. After the deductions, the complainant was left with only enough funds to cover her living expenses. 

The Second Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Jan Svatoň) upheld the constitutional complaint and annulled the resolution of the Municipal Court in Prague of 31 May 2023 ref. No 67 To 170/2023-495 and the resolution of the District Court for Prague 6 of 12 April 2023 ref. No 16 PP 70/2017-477. The courts violated the complainant’s right to judicial protection and the protection of her personal liberty. 

If the parolee has led a good life during her probationary period and has complied with the conditions imposed, the court shall declare that her behaviour on parole was satisfactory. Otherwise, it shall decide that the parolee will serve the remainder of the sentence [Section 91(1) of the Criminal Code]. The complainant was to serve the remainder of her sentence because, according to the courts, she had failed to compensate to the best of her ability the damage caused to the victims of her previous criminal activity. However, the Constitutional Court sees the courts’ reasoning as insufficient. The contested decisions are devoid of any substantial consideration of the complainant’s means (or the lack of thereof). 

In order for the complainant to be able to pay compensation for the damage caused to the best of her ability, she must have funds or assets that could be monetised for the benefit of the victims. Alternatively, she must be able to obtain these resources. However, the courts have not conducted any investigation into these matters. The complainant was 63 years old and in poor health at the time of the District Court’s decision. Moreover, she could not dispose of a substantial part of her income as it was subject to execution. In that situation, the order to serve the sentence of imprisonment would effectively punish the complainant for her poverty, which is inadmissible. The cause of poverty must be solely the parolee’s own will, not a persistent and intractable lack of funds.

According to the courts, the complainant failed to prove that the execution deductions were made for the benefit of the victims. However, the Constitutional Court finds such argumentation unacceptable. It contradicts the logic of the execution proceedings. A person obliged in execution proceedings cannot influence who receives the sums collected. The complainant could not put an end to the execution proceedings initiated on the application of another person other than by paying the amount due. At the same time, she could not herself initiate execution proceedings in favour of the victims of her criminal activities. A substantial part of the complainant’s funds were forcibly seized by the court executor (i.e. a State authority). That fact cannot be taken to the complainant’s disadvantage by another State authority in a way that results in an order to serve a sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of debts. Moreover, the courts could have established the details of the execution proceedings rather easily by calling on the relevant court executor offices, which they did not do. Nor did they establish for certain whether any of the execution proceedings were conducted for the benefit of the victims. 

The case is now back before the general courts. The District Court will have to thoroughly assess the complainant’s financial situation during her probationary period. Only then will it be able to assess the extent to which the complainant was able to pay the compensation “to the best of her ability” as ordered by the court on her conditional release. And only then will it be possible to decide whether the complainant should actually serve the remainder of her sentence.