Headnotes:

When deciding on a conditional release from imprisonment, the ordinary courts are obliged, when assessing the condition of the expectation of the convict to lead an orderly life, to evaluate all the specific circumstances of the case and to give due consideration to the potential possibility that the convict has been corrected and can be expected to lead an orderly life in the future, in particular, if he has a solid family background, secure housing and employment. In so far as the lower courts based their decisions solely on the convict's repeated offences, without taking into account the fact that he had served his previous prison sentences many years ago and that in the meantime he had been given only alternative sentences, all of which he had served, they infringed the prohibition of double punishment set in Article 40(5) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.

Summary:

I. District Court in Břeclav (Court of First Instance) rejected the complainant’s application for conditional release from a thirty-six-month prison sentence. The Court of First Instance found that the complainant had fulfilled the condition of serving half of his prison sentence and the condition of improvement, but had not fulfilled the third legal condition, i.e., the expectation that he would lead an orderly life in the future. It acknowledged that the complainant had a solid family background, secure housing and employment, but pointed to the complainant's extensive criminal history. The court noted that he was serving his third prison sentence and also took into account that the complainant had appealed in another criminal case, in which he had been ultimately found guilty, and contested his guilt. The court thus concluded that the applicant lacked the necessary degree of self-reflection and that the complainant's sentence had not yet served its purpose.

The Regional Court in Brno (Court of Appeal) agreed with the first-instance court's conclusion and dismissed the complainant's appeal. It pointed out that the complainant had a total of 11 criminal records and had been convicted of various criminal offences since 1994.

II. The Constitutional Court first summarised the general principles applied in the case law when assessing the institution of conditional release. In particular, it focused on the right to judicial protection of the convicted person, his right to a fair criminal trial, the constitutional requirements regarding the decision on conditional release and, last but not least, the conditions of conditional release.

The Constitutional Court criticised the conduct of the lower courts, which focused exclusively on the complainant's criminal record when assessing the prognosis that he would lead an orderly life in the future.

The Court of First Instance pointed out that this was the third time the complainant had been imprisoned (his previous sentences were served 21 and 26 years ago) and reprimanded the complainant for filing an appeal in another (unrelated) criminal case in which he contested his guilt, even though he was subsequently found guilty. The Court of First Instance referred to the complainant's criminal history, from which they inferred that the risk of a conditional release would still be too high.

The Constitutional Court does not consider such reasoning to be appropriate and based on sufficient factual grounds, nor does it consider it to be logical. Above all, that reasoning does not adequately reflect current information about the applicant which might indicate an internal change and a change of his perception of his past socially harmful conduct. On the one hand, the lower courts concluded that the applicant had improved during his sentence, but on the other hand, they did not consider that he could be expected to lead an orderly life, given his past behaviour. Neither the Court of First Instance nor the Court of Appeal gave any specific reasons beyond the applicant's criminal record, which led them to the conclusion that the applicant had not yet genuinely reconsidered his previous life and that the process of re-socialisation had not been completed. They did not elaborate on the activities that the complainant is engaged in while serving his sentence nor on the fact that he has secured housing and employment, that he has maintained contact with his family throughout his sentence and that his behaviour during his sentence has been evaluated by the prison as proper and unproblematic.

Moreover, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the courts had not indicated in any way how the applicant's further serving of an unconditional prison sentence would be beneficial to his rehabilitation, e.g., what specific activities he should undertake while still serving his sentence which would deepen his improvement and increase his chances of leading an orderly life. The courts merely stated that, given the applicant's criminal record, the conditional release was not an option.

The Constitutional Court found that the lower courts did not sufficiently motivate the contested decisions and did not fulfil all the obligations arising from a constitutionally consistent interpretation of Section 88 of the Criminal Code governing the institution of conditional release. In doing so, they violated the complainant's right to fair trial and the prohibition of double punishment. The Constitutional Court, therefore, annulled the contested decisions.

III. Pavel Šámal served as the judge rapporteur in the case. Judge Jan Filip dissented from part of the operative part no. I regarding the violation of the prohibition of double punishment and the related part of the reasoning of the judgment. Judge Josef Fiala dissented from the operative part of the judgment and the reasoning of the judgment.