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Obligation to pay maintenance costs on behalf of a person in a vegetative state

III. ÚS 39/22 

The principle of full compensation reflects the obligation to apply and interpret the relevant legal rules in a way that compensates for personal injury, including its consequences, using all available legal means and effectively in time and place. In cases where the statutory provisions do not cover all possible situations that may arise in human life, it is the task of the courts not to adhere only to the basic methods of interpretation, but to take into account the individual rights guaranteed by the constitutional order, which are translated into statutory provisions and which the courts are required to protect under Article 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic.

Summary:

I. In the civil proceedings, the plaintiff sought to recover maintenance costs for the survivor in the amount of 3 000 CZK per month. In January 2019, there was a road accident for which the driver of a lorry was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence and a driving ban for the offence of negligent homicide. The complainant's mother was fatally injured in the accident and was kept in a vegetative state until January 2020, when she died. At the time of the accident, the complainant, as a student in her final year of secondary school, was dependent on her mother for support, who was in receipt of a disability pension. The applicant's father also contributed to her maintenance with the sum of CZK 3 000 CZK per month. The applicant's mother's invalidity pension was paid into her mother's account at the time of her vegetative state and the applicant's housing payments were provided for by a standing order. At the relevant time, however, the complainant did not have access to her mother's account and was therefore unable to use it to pay for her personal needs, in particular those relating to her education. The District Court dismissed the applicant's action. It interpreted Section 2966 of the Civil Code, which provides for compensation to the survivors of a deceased person only. The wording of the provision was clear and did not give rise to doubts even when other methods of interpretation were applied. The District Court found that it was not its task to create a new claim not provided for in the law (i.e. a compensation on behalf of a person in a vegetative state). The Municipal Court upheld the judgment.

II. The Constitutional Court first stated that in the event of a conflict between the literal wording of a statute and its meaning and purpose, the courts may (or even must) deviate from the text of the statute in favour of a teleological interpretation for compelling reasons. In such a case, the contra or praeter legem procedure is acceptable. The Court further recalls that the principle of full compensation implies that the courts are obliged to apply and interpret the relevant legal norms in a way that compensates for the personal injury, including its consequences, using all available legal means and efficiently in time and place.    

In the context of the case under review, the Constitutional Court noted that the subject-matter of the decision of the general courts was the surviving daughter's claim for compensation for maintenance for the period during which her mother, fatally injured as a result of a car accident, had been kept in a vegetative state of physical existence. The victim was therefore completely incapable of acts or legal actions that would even suggest a real capacity to exercise the rights and perform the duties of a parent within the meaning of Article 32(4) of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The Constitutional Court considered that the general courts in the present case failed to take into account the fact that real life does not exist when the basic biological functions which make it human are not in operation.  

According to the Constitutional Court, the interpretation of the applicable legal norm (Section 2966 of the Civil Code) by the general courts did not place sufficient emphasis on its main purpose, which is to compensate the maintenance costs of persons who were dependent on the deceased person for their maintenance on the date of their death. If, as a result of the accident and the injuries sustained in the accident, the victim was not able to provide her daughter with maintenance at all, the courts were entitled to equate the victim's established state of health with her death and to award the survivor a claim for compensation for the period from the time of the victim's injury until her death. Such an interpretation of the law may be characterised as being made contra verba legem, but above all as being consistent with the main purpose of the legal norm for which the regulation of the specific claim, or title to compensation, was adopted. At the same time, the Constitutional Court rejected the thesis that even a significant amount of compensation from another claim (here, insurance compensation for non-pecuniary damage to a close person) would "refund" the missing amount of money from another claim.

In view of the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the general courts, in their interpretation of Section 2966 of the Civil Code, did not take sufficient account of the importance of the time interval between the harmful event (the fatal injury to the victim), the subsequent state of health of the victim and the moment of the survivor's claim, which is generally associated by law with the death of the victim. In cases where the statutory provisions do not cover all the possible situations that may arise in human life, it is the task of the courts not to adhere only to the basic methods of interpretation, but to take into account the individual rights guaranteed by the constitutional order, which are implied by the statutory provisions and which the courts are required to protect under Article 4 of the Constitution.

As this was not done, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant had not been properly afforded judicial protection under Article 36(1) of the Czech Charter and that her fundamental right to respect for private and family life under Article 8(1) of the Convention had thus been violated. It therefore quashed the contested decisions of the general courts.