Headnotes:
I. The question of the possibility to freely decide to end one's own life, even with the assistance of a third party, falls within the scope of the right to respect for physical and mental integrity under Article 7(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
II. A legitimate aim of restricting the right to privacy in relation to decisions about ending one's own life is to protect vulnerable persons from decisions made hastily, under duress, in distress, or in other circumstances in which such a decision would not be a genuine expression of personal autonomy. The protection of the right to self-determination must not result in endangering or marginalization of the fundamental rights of vulnerable groups of people, or direct forced interference with their physical integrity.
III. Specific predictions regarding the health condition of a person seeking euthanasia and the prospects for the manner and timing of the end of their life influence the weight of such a request on the imaginary scales measuring the admissibility of restricting the right to respect for physical and mental integrity and the right to privacy.
Summary:
I. The complainant filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Health seeking consent to an intervention into his personal integrity consisting of euthanasia.
The district court dismissed the lawsuit. It stated that there was no legal framework for granting the complainant's request. The constitutionally protected inviolability of the person prohibits any unlawful interference with his physical and mental integrity. On the contrary, the Czech Criminal Code criminalizes euthanasia. According to the district court, the evidence presented did not indicate that the complainant was in the terminal stage of illness or that his human dignity had not been preserved. The appellate court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the complainant's appeal, stating that neither domestic nor international law provides for a right to euthanasia.
In his constitutional complaint, the complainant argued that the ability to freely decide to end one's life is a fundamental aspect of personal autonomy and human dignity. For this reason, state authorities should allow euthanasia.
II. The Constitutional Court stated that end-of-life issues are among the most debated areas of constitutional law, as they concern not only the right to life, but also human dignity and individual autonomy. Their perception is shaped by legal, ethical, religious, and cultural ideas, as well as by progress in medicine and improvements in quality of life. These facts justify legal restraint and require careful consideration of whether and to what extent the right to make a free decision about the end of life can be subsumed under constitutionally guaranteed rights and how it can be restricted, if necessary.
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights is based on the premise that the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not imply a right to assistance in dying. At the same time, however, the right to decide on the manner and timing of one's own death is part of the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention. However, this right is not absolute and must be balanced against the positive state obligations to protect life and vulnerable persons. Member States have broad discretion in this area – they may maintain criminal prohibition or allow conditional decriminalization of euthanasia or assisted suicide, provided that they adopt sufficient safeguards to protect life.
According to the Constitutional Court, the mere refusal to grant requested active euthanasia does not constitute an infringement of an individual's dignity. The right to life protects human existence and cannot be used to infer a right to a dignified death; at the same time, however, it cannot be used to infer an absolute ban on euthanasia or assisted suicide. The Charter allows the legislature to define exceptional cases of non-punishable acts leading to death, but it must respect the conditions for restricting fundamental rights. The current case law of the Constitutional Court recognizes the right of a competent person to refuse life-saving treatment and accepts the right to a dignified natural death. However, the conditions for the possible legalization of euthanasia are a matter for the legislator.
In the case in question, the complainant requested consent to so-called requested active euthanasia, i.e., an intervention in which another person ends a person's life on the basis of an explicit request. The Constitutional Court assessed the case as a claim aimed at the positive obligations of the state within the framework of the right to respect for physical and mental integrity and the right to privacy, which, however, must be weighed against the protection of the right to life. It noted that Czech law does not regulate euthanasia or assisted suicide and punishes them as criminal offenses. The legitimate aim of the current legislation is, in particular, to protect life and vulnerable persons, prevent coercion, and preserve the ethical integrity of a medical profession.
The Constitutional Court assessed active euthanasia as a more serious intervention than assisted suicide, with higher risks of error and abuse. Any legalization would therefore require exceptionally strong safeguards – but it is primarily the legislator, not the court, that should decide on the form of these safeguards.
The Constitutional Court added that the complainant does not suffer from a terminal illness or the prospect of a painful death. At the same time, it pointed to the availability of health and social care and to the fact that the complainant also suffers from a mental disorder, which increases the need for protective mechanisms. The complainant's request to allow active euthanasia was not proportionate in view of these circumstances, and therefore the intervention of the Constitutional Court was out of the question.
For these reasons, the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional complaint.
The Justice Rapporteur in the case was Lucie Dolanská Bányaiová. None of the Justices dissented.